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THE SECURITIES LAWS AND THE MECHANICS OF
LEGAL CHANGE
Barry Cushman*
T HE contribution to this symposium co-authored by Professor
Pritchard and Professor Thompson is an industriously re-
searched and thoughtfully argued paper exploring the role of
Franklin Roosevelt's fascinating cast of Supreme Court appointees
in enacting, defending, and ultimately interpreting the New Deal
securities laws. Their paper makes a valuable contribution not only
to the historiography of the regulation of American financial mar-
kets, but also to three related literatures on the mechanics of legal
change. The first is a line of political science literature that traces
itself to a classic 1957 article by Robert Dahl, which argues that
dominant national political alliances eventually succeed in bringing
the policy views of the federal judiciary into harmony with their
own through regular judicial appointments.' The second is a grow-
* James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, F.D.G. Ribble Research Profes-
sor, and Professor of History, University of Virginia.
'Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a Na-
tional Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 284-88, 291, 293-94 (1957). For examples of
work in this tradition, see Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Main-
springs of American Politics 10 (1970); John B. Gates, The Supreme Court and Parti-
san Change: Contravening, Provoking, and Diffusing Partisan Conflict, in The Su-
preme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations 98 (Howard
Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); Howard Gillman, The Waite Court (1874-
1888): The Collapse of Reconstruction and the Transition to Conservative Constitu-
tionalism, in The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice 124, 128, 145
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005); Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower
Court Selection from Roosevelt Through Reagan (1997); Terri Jennings Peretti, In De-
fense of a Political Court 133 (1999); Robert Scigliano, The Supreme Court and the
Presidency (1971); Martin Shapiro, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Future of the Su-
preme Court, in An Essential Safeguard: Essays on the United States Supreme Court
and Its Justices 145 (D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. ed., 1991); Martin Shapiro, The Su-
preme Court: From Warren to Burger, in The New American Political System 179
(Anthony King ed., 1978); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Po-
litical Order: Collaboration and Confrontation, in The Supreme Court and American
Political Development 117, 129 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); Richard
Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975);
Howard Gillman, First Amendment Doctrine as Regime Politics, 14 The Good Soc'y
59 (2005); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance
Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
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ing body of historical scholarship on the Supreme Court during the
New Deal, which emphasizes the importance of changes in Court
personnel to transformations in substantive due process and consti-
tutional federalism.2 The third, which builds on the first two, is a
strand of positive constitutional theory that contends that judicial
appointments are the means by which constitutional revolutions,
including that of the New Deal, have been achieved
Pritchard and Thompson's principal thesis, which is congruent
with these three bodies of scholarship, is that "Roosevelt ulti-
mately prevailed [in establishing his securities law program] when
he was able to appoint lawyers to the Supreme Court who had a
proven record of supporting a broad role for government regula-
tion of the economy.... As events unfolded, Roosevelt's appoint-
ees would ensure the survival of the securities laws.. . ."' Yet there
is another, perhaps more familiar story of constitutional change
during the New Deal-one that sees the transformation of consti-
tutional doctrine principally as the product of external political
pressures on the Court, such as the 1936 election and the Court-
packing plan, rather than of changes in judicial personnel.'
511, 517 (2002); Howard Gillman, Regime Politics, Jurisprudential Regimes, and Un-
enumerated Rights, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 107 (2006); William E. Hulbary & Thomas
G. Walker, The Supreme Court Selection Process: Presidential Motivations and Judi-
cial Performance, 33 W. Pol. Q. 185 (1980); Kevin J. McMahon, Constitutional Vision
and Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race, 14 Stud. Am. Pol.
Dev. 20, 24, 28 (2000).
2 Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitu-
tional Revolution (1998) [hereinafter Cushman, Rethinking]; G. Edward White, The
Constitution and the New Deal (2000); Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities [hereinafter
Cushman, Lost Fidelities], 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 95 (1999); Barry Cushman, Some
Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism [hereinafter Cushman, Varieties and Vicissi-
tudes], 85 B.U. L. Rev. 881, 982-98 (2005); Richard Friedman, Switching Time and
Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation,
142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994).
'Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 Fordham L. Rev.
489, 489-502, 533-35 (2006); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1066-68, 1073-76, 1082-83, 1092
(2001).4 A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices,
95 Va. L. Rev. 841,873 (2009).
'The exemplar is William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Con-
stitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (1995). For citations to many other in-
stances of this view, see Cushman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 227-28 nn.1, 8, 9, & 17.
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Pritchard and Thompson occasionally introduce elements of that
story line into their account, and I will make three points about
that feature of their analysis: first, that it rests uneasily next to their
principal claim; second, that it provides them with no explanatory
purchase with respect to the securities law developments they ex-
amine; and third, that it is therefore an irrelevant excrescence on
their otherwise admirable article.
Pritchard and Thompson's charting of the Court's path toward
an open embrace of the New Deal securities laws starts with Jones
v. SEC,6 where the Court castigated the Commission for its refusal
to permit the withdrawal of a registration statement. "The tenor of
the opinion," the authors contend, "did not bode well for the Act's
constitutionality."7 The first sign of a departure from the posture
taken by the Court in Jones, Pritchard and Thompson suggest,
came in the case of Landis v. North American Co.8 -a decision
rendered before there had been any change in the Court's person-
nel. There, pending the resolution of a similar suit brought by the
Commission before another court, the district court had stayed
suits brought by two holding companies seeking to restrain the
SEC from enforcing the Public Utilities Holding Company Act.9
Pritchard and Thompson report that the Court unanimously ap-
proved the stay,'" but as I read the opinion the Justices held that
the district court had abused its discretion in extending the stay un-
til resolution of the pending case by the Supreme Court, vacated
the order of the district court, and remanded the case for a rehear-
ing to determine whether, in view of the principles set forth in the
opinion, any further stay of the proceedings should be ordered."
The North American case, Pritchard and Thompson inform us, was
heard by the Supreme Court
a week after Roosevelt's smashing landslide in the 1936 elec-
tion.... In contrast to the hostility toward the SEC and its proc-
esses that was visible in Jones, this opinion, written by Justice
Cardozo for a unanimous Court, was considerably more accom-
6298 U.S. 1 (1936).
'Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 876.
8299 U.S. 248 (1936).
9 See id. at 249-53.
"'Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 880-81.
"See Landis, 299 U.S. at 256-59.
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modating toward agency action .... Not only did the SEC win,
but the caustic language of Jones had disappeared. 2
It is not entirely clear to me that the SEC actually won in this in-
stance. As a commentator in the Michigan Law Review observed,
"Since it can be assumed that both parties are primarily interested
in a decision of the Supreme Court, it may be questioned what will
be gained by a stay extending only until a decision by the district
court."' 3 But Pritchard and Thompson's suggestion here, I take it, is
that both the SEC's ostensible victory and the disappearance of the
critical language on display in Jones were direct judicial responses
to Roosevelt's commanding electoral victory. Otherwise, why men-
tion the intervening election?
Yet it seems to me quite unlikely that the election had anything
to do with the outcome in North American. The decision was, after
all, unanimous; even the Four Horsemen joined." And as the
events of 1937 would demonstrate, the voting behavior of the Four
Horsemen did not reflect a preoccupation with getting on the right
side of history. In view of the fact that they continued to file critical
dissents from the highest profile decisions upholding New Deal leg-
islation, 5 one doubts that they concurred in North American for
any reason other than that they believed it was correctly decided.
And the absence of the critical tone present in the Jones opinion
may have been the product both of the fact that North American,
unlike Jones, involved review of the action of a lower court rather
than that of the Commission, and that the opinion was assigned to
the sweet-tempered Justice Cardozo, who had dissented from Jus-
tice Sutherland's majority opinion in Jones.6
Pritchard and Thompson do not contend, however, that the deci-
sion in North American constituted an unmistakable switch-in-time
12 Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 880-81.
"Jack L. White, Recent Decision, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 996, 997 (1937).
1" Justice McReynolds concurred in the result, and Justice Stone did not participate.
See Landis, 299 U.S. at 259.
"S See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76-103 (1937)
(McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, JJ., dissenting from opinion uphold-
ing National Labor Relations Act); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598-
609 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting from decision upholding Social Security Act);
id. at 609-16 (Sutherland & Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting); id. at 616-18 (Butler, J.,
dissenting).
,6 See 298 U.S. 1, 29-33 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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that saved nine. "Despite this procedural victory," they write,
"PUHCA, like other New Deal legislation, remained at risk in the
shadow cast by the Supreme Court's constitutional holdings ....
The Supreme Court that would eventually uphold the constitution-
ality of economic regulation, including the securities laws, was not
yet visible."'7 At this point it bears emphasis that the Supreme
Court's constitutional holdings included recent decisions sustaining
commodity price regulation,18 state debtor relief in the form of a
mortgage foreclosure moratorium,19 the Government's major re-
orientation of monetary policy in the Gold Clause Cases,' and the
Tennessee Valley Authority.21 Two weeks before North American
was decided, the Court had upheld the New York unemployment
compensation statute.' The Court had upheld state blue sky laws
in a trio of decisions handed down nearly two decades earlier.'
And as a number of contemporary commentators and jurists would
point out, there were ample commerce clause precedents to sup-
port several aspects of the New Deal securities law program." The
prospect was not altogether bleak.
Pritchard and Thompson set the litigation of Electric Bond &
Share Co. v. SEC5 against the backdrop of the struggle over the
Court-packing bill in Congress, suggesting that the Court's juris-
prudence was dramatically altered in response to pendency of that
proposal. "In the period between the district court and Supreme
Court decisions," they argue, "Roosevelt's Court-packing plan had
been rebuffed by Congress, but the Court's direction had nonethe-
less changed radically." 6 They point in particular to the March 29
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,27 which upheld Wash-
ington state's minimum wage law for women. They observe in a
'7Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 881.
"See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
'0 See Norman v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935).
21 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
See W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936) (per curiam).
See Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
See infra notes 48-51.
303 U.S. 419 (1938).26 Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 882.
27 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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footnote that "[s]cholars have more recently questioned the extent
to which Roberts 'switched,"' but defend their reading by observ-
ing that "for Frankfurter at least the move was transparent."' The
day after the Parrish decision, they point out, Frankfurter wrote to
Roosevelt, "[a]nd now, with the shift by Roberts, even a blind man
ought to see that the Court is in politics.
29
I have said a good deal about this "Roosevelt lost the battle but
won the war" argument in the past,30 and do not propose to repeat
myself at length here. Let me offer just two quick observations.
First, it has been known at least since 1951 that Roberts cast his
vote to uphold the minimum wage statute at the conference held
December 19, 1936-more than six weeks before the Court-
packing plan, a very closely guarded secret, was revealed." William
Leuchtenburg, the leading authority on the origins of the Court-
packing plan,32 and a scholar not unsympathetic to externalist ex-
planations of judicial behavior,3 has long recognized that the
Court-packing plan could not have influenced that vote?' Pritchard
and Thompson's apparent suggestion that Roberts's vote in Parrish
was the result of the Court-packing threat is thus extraordinarily
difficult to defend. Moreover, it is also entirely superfluous to the
defense of their principal thesis.
' Pritchard & Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 40 n.178 (Sept.
9, 2008) (unpublished conference paper, on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation). In the revised version of their paper published here, the authors have grace-
fully receded from this contention, now recognizing that Roberts cast his vote in Par-
rish well before he knew of the Court-packing plan, that his vote was "probably
wrongly" characterized as a switch, and that Frankfurter only believed that "the
switch was transparent" "[a]t the time." Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 882
n.188.
29 Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 882 n.188 (quoting Letter from Felix
Frankfurter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 30, 1937) (on file with the Felix Frank-
furter Collection, Harvard Law School Library, Reel 155)).
'0 See generally Cushman, Rethinking, supra note 2.
, See Merlo J. Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes 757 (1951). Two contemporary jour-
nalists were aware as early as 1938 that the Parrish vote had taken place before the
announcement of the Court-packing plan, though they believed that the vote had
taken place in January of 1937 rather than in December of 1936. See Joseph Alsop &
Turner Catledge, The 168 Days 140 (1938).
" See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-
Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347.33 See, e.g., Leuchtenburg, supra note 5, at 213-36.




Second, Pritchard and Thompson's selection of Frankfurter's
March 30 letter to Roosevelt to substantiate their claim that Rob-
erts switched in Parrish is particularly curious. Years later, after he
had had the opportunity to become informed about the matter-
and after his relentless cultivation of Roosevelt had secured him a
seat on the Court-Frankfurter recanted his earlier view. When
Roberts retired in 1945, Frankfurter joined Jackson in insisting that
Stone leave in his draft of the Court's letter to Roberts the line,
"You have made fidelity to principle your guide to decision." 35 In
1953, Frankfurter wrote privately to Paul Freund concerning the
minimum wage cases, "The fact is that Roberts did not switch. He
was prepared in Tipaldo to make a majority overruling Adkins....
Because there was no majority for overruling Adkins he was in the
majority in the Morehead case."36 And in a special issue of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review published following Roberts'
death in 1955, Frankfurter publicly repudiated the contention that
Roberts had switched in Parrish.37 In my view, it is entirely unnec-
essary for Pritchard and Thompson to take a position on whether
Roberts switched in Parrish. But if they do propose to weigh in on
the issue, it might behoove them to rely upon a source who did not
himself later reverse his judgment on the matter.
More persuasive is Pritchard and Thompson's assessment that,
by the time that Electric Bond & Share got to the Court, "the de-
parture of two of the four Horsemen"-Justices Van Devanter and
Sutherland, each of whom had retired-had "changed the balance
of power on the Court."38 Those retirements were in many respects
crucial to the near-term course of constitutional development.39 But
here the authors may overstate the importance of personnel
changes in greasing the skids for judicial acceptance of the New
" See Cushman, Lost Fidelities, supra note 2, at 97-99.
16Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund, Professor, Harvard Law
Sch. (Oct. 18, 1953) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection, Harvard Law
School Library, Part 3, Reel 15), quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or
Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 633 n.78 (1994).
31 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1955). The
"switch-in-time" thesis was similarly rejected in another article, published in the same
issue, by Dean Erwin N. Griswold. See Owen J. Roberts as a Judge, 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 332, 340-44 (1955).
Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 882-83.
39See, e.g., Cushman, Lost Fidelities, supra note 2, at 129-45; Cushman, Varieties
and Vicissitudes, supra note 2, at 982-98.
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Deal securities laws. For Pritchard and Thompson observe that not
only did Electric Bond & Share explicitly uphold the registration
provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, it also "im-
plicitly affirmed the constitutionality of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act."' The sole dissenter from Chief Justice Hughes's
opinion was Justice McReynolds." Justice Butler, the other remain-
ing Horseman, joined the majority. Justice Butler is not generally
thought to have changed his constitutional views in response to the
Court-packing plan, nor, for that matter, in response to any other
stimulus. In the spring of 1937 he dissented from the opinions up-
holding the minimum wage statute,2 the National Labor Relations
Act, 3 and the Social Security Act." By the time the Court decided
Electric Bond & Share in the spring of 1938, the external pressures
on the Court were significantly fewer than they had been the pre-
ceding spring. The Court-packing plan had been defeated, a bipar-
tisan anti-New Deal coalition had formed in Congress, and the leg-
islative branch had begun to rebuff the President at nearly every
turn.45 "A year after his overwhelming triumph in the 1936 elec-
tion," wrote William Leuchtenburg, "Roosevelt appeared to be a
thoroughly repudiated leader."' If the implacable Justice Butler
could join an opinion both explicitly upholding the Public Utility
Holding Company Act's registration provisions and implicitly af-
firming the constitutionality of the Securities and Exchange Act in
March of 1938, then there is reason to wonder whether the consti-
tutional fate of those Acts-or at least that of certain of their pro-
visions-was ever in serious jeopardy.
Pritchard and Thompson quote an interview recorded by Katie
Louchheim in the early 1980s, in which Joseph Rauh asserted that
"[i]f you had asked anyone in 1935 if the Supreme Court would
" Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 883.
"See Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting without opinion).
42 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400-14 (1937) (Sutherland,
Van Devanter, McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
'4 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76-103 (1937)
(McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
" See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 616-18 (1937) (Butler, J., dis-
senting).
45 See Cushman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 30-31.
, Leuchtenburg, supra note 34, at 251.
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uphold the Public Utility Holding Company Act, you would have
been laughed at." 7 In view of the vote in Electric Bond & Share, it
appears that Mr. Rauh may have been indulging in a bit of hyper-
bole. A commentator in the January 1936 issue of the Yale Law
Journal, for example, seemed optimistic that the registration provi-
sions of the Act might be sustained as an exercise of the commerce
power,48 while a colleague writing in the George Washington Law
Review was prepared to defend the Act's constitutionality more
generally.49 Commentators in other law journals had expressed con-
fidence that at least some of the provisions of the 1933"0
7 Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 873 (quoting Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Clerks
of the Court on the Justices, in The Making of the New Deal: The Insiders Speak 55,
57 (Katie Louchheim ed., 1983)). From his remarks in a separate interview for the
book, it appears that Rauh believed that the Court would have invalidated the regis-
tration provisions of PUHCA in 1935 and 1936. In describing Ben Cohen's efforts to
avoid a constitutional challenge to the registration provisions of the statute, Rauh
opined that "[t]he Supreme Court of 1935-36 was a very conservative Court, which
would have held the Holding Company Act unconstitutional." Jospeh L. Rauh, Jr.,
The Draftsmen, in The Making of the New Deal, supra, at 111. After recounting
Cohen's success in persuading the Court not to grant certiorari in a 1935 case from the
Fourth Circuit, Rauh reports that "[t]he Electric Bond and Share case got there a
couple of years later. The Court had changed by then and Ben won." Id. at 112.
" Compare Comment, Federal Regulation of Holding Companies: The Public Util-
ity Act of 1935, 45 Yale L.J. 468, 485-89 (1936), with Note, The Constitutionality of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 23 Va. L. Rev. 678, 692 (1937) (ex-
pressing doubt that the Act could be constitutionally applied to companies other than
those "whose chief business is the interstate sale of gas and electricity," but holding
out the prospect that a Court made "more liberal.., through a change in its person-
nel" might find a "vital connection" between holding companies and interstate com-
merce).
Recent Cases, 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532, 535-36 (1936).
See George J. Feldman, The New Federal Securities Act, 14 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 6 n.26
(1934) ("There seems little doubt that the Act, based on the Congressional power
over interstate commerce and the mails, is, in almost all its provisions, well beyond
constitutional interdict."); Legislation, The Securities Act of 1933, 33 Colum. L. Rev.
1220, 1221-23 (1933) (expressing confidence in the Act's constitutionality); Deneen
A. Watson, The Illinois and Federal Securities Acts, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 45 (1934) (in-
clining to view the Act as constitutional); Herman Goralnik, Note, Securities As Sub-
jects of Interstate Commerce, 19 St. Louis L. Rev. 69, 74-76 (1933) ("[I]t seems that
the sale, offer to sell, or transportation of securities among the states ... is interstate
commerce subject to federal regulation.... [T]he court, if it so desires, would find no
difficulty in affirming the Act as being within the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the states.... [Cases supporting this view] should prevail over
[older cases suggesting a contrary result because the latter] have been distinguished
on other grounds."). But cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Securities Act and the Constitution,
2009] 935
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and 1934"' Acts would be upheld under the commerce power, and
all three statutes had been upheld by lower federal courts antici-
pating review by the Supreme Court. As Pritchard and Thompson
observe, 2 the district court, in an opinion written by Taft appointee
Julian Mack, 3 had ruled in favor of the SEC in the Electric Bond &
Share case on January 29, 1937, 4 a week before the announcement
of the Court-packing plan and months before the announcement of
the Court's decision in the minimum wage and National Labor Re-
lations Act cases. Indeed, law review commentators on the decision
greeted it without surprise, finding the Court's commerce clause
holding well grounded in a long line of decisions antedating 1937."
Hoover appointee Gunnar Nordbye56 of the District of Minnesota
upheld the constitutionality of the registration provisions of the
1933 Act in September of 1935,"7 just a few months after the
43 Yale L.J. 218 (1933) (expressing doubt); Comment, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 811 (1934)
(expressing uncertainty).
51 See Jacob Lippman, Constitutionality of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9
St. John's L. Rev. 1, 23 (1934) (concluding that "the powers entrusted to the Commis-
sion are valid in all respects"); Milward W. Martin, Constitutionality of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 21 A.B.A. 1. 811, 815-17 (1935) (concluding that many of the
Act's provisions are constitutional exercises of the commerce power); Jess Halsted,
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Regulating Stock Exchanges, Trading in Securi-
ties, Etc. Under Administration of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2 J.
Marshall L.Q. 145, 149 (1936) (agreeing with Martin); see also Legislation, Delegation
of Power Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 974, 992
(1936) (rejecting contention that the Act violates the nondelegation doctrine). But cf.
Legislation, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 255, 255-58
(1934) (expressing uncertainty concerning Act's constitutionality); John Hanna, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 23-29 (1934) (expressing uncer-
tainty concerning the Act's constitutionality).
52Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 4, at 881-82.
3 See Harold Chase et al., Biographical Dictionary of the Federal Judiciary 172
(1976).
'SEC v. Elec. Bond & Share Co., 18 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). The Second
Circuit affirmed that November. See 92 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1937). Compare Electric
Bond & Share, 92 F.2d 580, with In re American States Public Service Co., 12 F. Supp.
667 (D. Md. 1935) and Burco, Inc. v. Whitworth, 81 F.2d 721, 740 (4th Cir. 1936),
holding unconstitutional the application of the Act to debtors in bankruptcy not en-
gaged in interstate commerce.
See Gerald L. Stoetzer, Comment, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1324, 1332-36 (1938); Recent
Case, 12 Temp. L.Q. 400, 400-02 (1938); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-
Validity of Registration Provisions of Public Utility Holding Company Act, 24 Va. L.
Rev. 328, 329 (1938).
'6 See Chase et al., supra note 53, at 208-09.
"7 SECv. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1935).
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Court's unanimous decision lowering the curtain on the National
Industrial Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States.m District courts in Tennessee59 and Wisconsin' simi-
larly sustained the 1933 Act on September 15 and December 1,
1936, respectively-months after the Jones decision and well be-
fore the announcement of the Court's decisions upholding the
minimum wage and the National Labor Relations Act. Coolidge
appointee Curtis Wilbur6' joined two Roosevelt appointees (Fran-
cis Garrecht and Bert Haney62) in sustaining the 1933 Act on
March 1, 1937,63 weeks before West Coast Hotel and the Labor
Board Cases were handed down. Hoover appointee Robert Patter-
son 6" of the federal district court in New York upheld provisions of
the 1934 Act regulating trading in securities by means of interstate
commerce or on a national securities exchange on April 10, 1936, a
mere four days after Jones was handed down.6" And in the Jones
case itself, Hoover appointee Francis Caffey' had upheld the 1933
Act as a constitutional exercise of the commerce power at the trial
level,67 and that judgment had been affirmed by a unanimous Sec-
ond Circuit panel,' two of whose members had been appointed by
President Coolidge.69 The view that these provisions of the securi-
ties laws were constitutional was not confined to New Dealers.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
United States v. Bogy, 16 F. Supp. 407,411-13 (W.D. Tenn. 1936).
6 SEC v. Crude Oil Corp., 17 F. Supp. 164, 167 (W.D. Wis. 1936), aff'd, 93 F.2d 844
(7th Cir. 1937).
61 See Chase et al., supra note 53, at 301.
62 See id. at 98-99, 115.
63 Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1937).
See Chase et al., supra note 53, at 216.
65 SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d
446 (2d Cir. 1937). See also McMann v. Engel, 16 F. Supp. 446, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1936),
in which Judge Patterson upheld the 1934 Act against a nondelegation challenge on
August 5, 1936.
See Chase et al., supra note 53, at 40.
SECv. Jones, 12 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). See also SEC v. Torr, 15 F.
Supp. 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), where Judge Caffey rejected the contention that the
denial to defendants of copies of testimony they had given during an investigation
carried on by a representative of the SEC deprived them of due process.
Jones v. SEC, 79 F.2d 617, 621 (2d Cir. 1935).
The two Coolidge appointees were Learned and Augustus Hand. See Chase et al.,
supra note 53, at 114-15. See also Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir.
1937), in which a panel comprised by Coolidge appointee Rufus Foster and Hoover
Virginia Law Review
If Justice Butler's vote to uphold PUHCA's registration provi-
sions and, by implication, the 1934 Act, was not the product of a
jurisprudential switch, then it is doubtful that the votes of Hughes
and Roberts are best accounted for by such a hypothesis. Indeed,
the suggestion that Hughes and Roberts switched on the securities
laws issue in 1937 is significantly undermined by their performance
in SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.7" in 1940. There
they dissented from Justice Stone's majority opinion recognizing
broad authority in the Commission to intervene in corporate reor-
ganizations under the Chandler Act.' As Justice Douglas wrote of
the case in his diary, "If the Chief had had his way, it would be an-
other Jones decision."72 Douglas's assessment suggests that
Hughes's and Roberts's views of the appropriate scope of the
Commission's authority had not become more relaxed between
1936 and 1940. This in turn further calls into question the sugges-
tion that their performances in Electric Bond & Share were the
product of a general change in attitude toward the securities laws
that they experienced in the shadow of the 1936 election and the
Court-packing plan. It is of course possible that they, along with
Butler, switched between Jones and Electric Bond & Share, and
then switched back in U.S. Realty; though it would be interesting to
see how Professors Pritchard and Thompson might account for
such a pattern of behavior, I do not find them addressing that ques-
tion in their article. My own suspicion is that positing such a behav-
ioral epicycle would not improve our understanding of the Justices,
and it is at this point that I start looking around for Ockham's ra-
zor. This is an instance in which it seems that Pritchard and
Thompson's general thesis has much greater explanatory power:
the Court's jurisprudence concerning the power of the Commission
changed not because Hughes and Roberts altered their positions,
but because Roosevelt had by 1940 placed five appointees on the
Court.
appointees Samuel Sibley and Joseph Hutcheson upheld provisions of both the 1933
and 1934 Acts. See Chase et al., supra note 53, at 94, 135, 252.70310 U.S. 434 (1940).
71 See id. at 461-69 (Roberts, J., Hughes, C.J., & McReynolds, J., dissenting).
SWilliam 0. Douglas, Diary (May 27, 1940) (on file with the William 0. Douglas
Collection, Library of Congress, Box 1780), quoted in Pritchard & Thompson, supra
note 4, at 885.
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The Securities Laws
By the time the Court upheld PUHCA's Section 11 in 1946, 73 no
member of the old Court remained. A Court dominated by Roose-
velt appointees had transformed commerce clause jurisprudence in
United States v. Darby74 and Wickard v. Filburn75-two landmark
decisions to which Pritchard and Thompson curiously do not refer.
Portions of the New Deal securities laws, the constitutionality of
which may have been doubted in the mid- and late-1930s, now
commanded the support of a unanimous Court. This final chapter
in the constitutional struggle over the New Deal securities law pro-
gram helps to underscore the persuasive power of Pritchard and
Thompson's principal thesis. Indeed, as I have tried to argue, their
paper is at its most persuasive when they adhere to that thesis,
while it falters when they yield to the temptation to muddy their
account with elements of a familiar and seductive but ultimately
unconvincing story. Their principal thesis is the one that best fits
the evidence, and I would encourage them to embrace it with the
confidence it so richly deserves.
73 See N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 707-10 (1946).
14 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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